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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to §78-2-2(5), Utah 
Code Ann. (1996) and Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This case presents the question of whether the Utah Court of Appeals correctly 
adopted the rule in Federated Dept. Stores v. Moitie! to govern determinations of issues 
where the law has changed but a party failed to appeal. 
Standard of Review 
On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, not that of the trial court.2 Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its reliance 
on a case for its decision is a question of law. The Utah Supreme Court reviews the 
Court of Appeals's conclusions of law for correctness and affords them no deference.3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioners4 own three homes in residential neighborhoods in Sandy City. At 
various times in the period prior to 1996 they claim to have rented these properties for 
periods of less than 30 days, which are referred to herein as "short-term" or "ski" rentals. 
1
 452 U.S. 394, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981) 
2
 Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2; see Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, H 15, 
7 P.3d 783 (Utah) 
3
 Rackley v. Fairview Care Centers, Inc., 2001 UT 32, f 23, 23 P.3d 1022, 1025 (Utah) 
4
 Herein called "Property Owners", "Owners", or the "Collinses." 
1 
Sandy City ordinances prohibit such uses. The Property Owners appealed a 
determination by the City's zoning administrator to the Board of Adjustment in 1996 on 
the issue of whether the City's ordinances prohibited short-term rentals or "ski" rentals 
(because the homes were allegedly rented for periods of a week at a time to skiers). The 
Board of Adjustment and District Court ruled in favor of the City. After the Collinses 
failed to appeal from the adverse district court decision, the Court of Appeals ruled 
against the City's position in another ski rental case, presenting the same issue, Brown et 
al v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment5 Pursuant to Brown, the City adopted an 
ordinance specifically prohibiting short-term rentals of less than 30 days. 
The Owners then returned to the Sandy Board of Adjustment claiming that the 
intervening Brown decision entitled them to rent three of their properties6 as short-term 
rentals. The City informed them that they still needed to prove that they were entitled to 
a nonconforming use, or that the properties were "grandfathered." The Sandy City 
Board of Adjustment and the district court ruled that the Owners failed to show that they 
qualified as nonconforming uses, and further, that because a nonconforming use of 
property must be legal when it commences, the Owners were collaterally estopped by the 
5957P.2d207(1998) 
6
 A fourth property, which was the subject of the previous litigation begun in 1996, is no 
longer an issue before the court, since the Owners apparently no longer own it: the 1456 
E. Longdale Drive home. 
2 
decision of the 1996 case from bringing the matter a second time. The Owners appealed 
that decision to the Court of Appeals, which ruled in favor of the City. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 26,1996, a Sandy City zoning code enforcement officer, Nolan 
Isom, sent a Notice and Order to the property owner, John Collins, directing him to stop 
operating three homes as transitory lodging facilities in violation of Sandy ordinances.7 
2. The Property Owners filed an appeal to the Sandy City Board of Adjustment 
from the determination of the City that the use of the three properties as short-term rental 
units was prohibited by the Sandy City Development Code. They also included in their 
appeal an additional property which had not been the subject of the cease and desist 
order, the property at 9255 South Maison Drive.8 
3. At the Board of Adjustment hearing, held August 8,1996, eleven residents 
from the neighborhoods where the homes were located, testified as to various 
complaints about the use of the Collinses' properties as "ski rentals".9 After hearing the 
7
 The subject properties were single family dwellings located at 1875 East Alia Panna 
Way, 1456 E. Longdate Drive, and 472 East 9400 South, in Sandy, Utah in residential 
zoning districts A copy of the Notice and Order is attached hereto as Tab No. 1. 
8
 R. at 156. The record before the Board of Adjustment in 1996 contains no mention of 
the fact that the 9255 South Maison Drive property had not actually been the subject of 
the cease and desist order, which was apparently overlooked by the Board in its decision, 
whi-jh thus applied to that property as well. 
9
 Among the complaints expressed about the plaintiffs' use of their properties at the 
August 1996 Board of Adjustment hearing were the following: 
(a) Poor upkeep (Aug. 8, 1996 Bd. of Adj. Minutes at 11, R. at 273); 
3 
evidence and arguments from the residents and the Owners, the Board of Adjustment 
ruled that the City's interpretation of its ordinances was correct and denied the appeal.10 
4. Owners filed a complaint with the Third District Court appealing the decision 
of the Sandy Board of Adjustment. The properties listed in the Amended Complaint11 
omitted the property at 9255 South Maison Drive. 
5. The district court, Judge Frank G. Noel, granted the City's motion for 
(b) Failure to shovel snow off of sidewalks, in one case for four weeks (1997 Bd 
of Adj. Minutes at p. 12, R. at 274) about which Mr. Collins responded that if tenants 
wish, they can shovel snow, and that tenants do shovel snow {Id. at 9); 
(c) Short-term rentals will lower the property values of the neighborhood {Id. at 
10,11) (R. at 273); 
(d) Traffic problems {Id. at 11), and a fear for the safety of children (Minutes at p. 
12, R. at 273); 
(e) There was no on-site management of the guests at the rental homes as there 
would be at a motel {Id. at 12, R. at 273); 
(f) Partying and loud music on weekends late into the night at properties where 
many beer cans were viewed {Id. at 11, 13R. at 273, 275); 
(g) Not knowing whom to contact when there were complaints about the 
properties {Id. at p. 13, R. at 276); 
(h) As many as nine cars at one of the Owners' properties {Id. at 13, R. at 275), 
although John Collins stated he limits the number of cars allowed in his rental agreements 
{Id. at p. 9, R. at 271) to only two or three cars at any of the rental homes {Id. at P. 10, R. 
at 272); 
(i) Allowing one of the properties to be rented violated restrictive covenants 
requiring that the buildings be used only for "a single family dwelling" for the subdivision 
in which it sits, and that the plaintiffs were aware of these covenants, which was 
supported by a letter signed by many of the residents and read at the hearing {Id. at p. 11, 
R. at 273). 
A copy of the minutes of that meeting are attached hereto as Tab no 2. 
101996 Bd. of Adj. Minutes at 14, Tab 2 R. at 276. Findings of fact and conclusions 
were not adopted by the Board in that proceeding. 
11
 Amended Complaint, R. at 174. 
4 
summary judgment and denied Owners' motion for summary judgment.12 The Owners 
did not appeal the court's decision.13 
6. On March 26,1998, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its opinion in another 
case involving short-term rentals in Sandy, Brown et al v. Sandy City Board of 
Adjustment}* In that case the court held that Sandy City's zoning ordinances did not 
prohibit rentals of less than 30 days in residential districts, but that the City could 
prohibit such uses if the it adopted an ordinance specifically forbidding them. The City's 
petition for certiorari to this court was denied. 
7. The Sandy City Council thereupon adopted an ordinance prohibiting short-
term rentals of 30 days or less in all residential districts in Sandy.15 
8. Owners sought to avoid the new ordinance by filing an application for 
nonconforming use status with the Sandy City Board of Adjustment on October 27, 
1998. This application was for three properties located at the following addresses: 1875 
East Alia Panna Way, 472 East 9400 South, and 9255 South Maison Drive.16 
12
 Revised Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal, R. at 210. 
13
 See November 12, 1998 Bd. of Adj. Minutes at 3, Tab 7 ; see also Brief of Appellants 
at 11 
14
 957 P.2d 207 
15
 R. at 214, 219, 224. 
16
 Record at 132. The property at 1456 E. Longdate Drive was not brought to the 
Board of Adjustment or subsequently to the district court, apparently because Owners 
had sold the home. 
5 
9. On November 12, 1998 the Sandy City Board of Adjustment held a hearing on 
the application for nonconforming use status. The Board denied Owners' request for 
nonconforming use status, finding (1) that the Owners had not used the properties as 
short-term rentals on the effective date of the new ordinance prohibiting short-term 
rentals17, and (2) that the decision in Brown did not apply to the Owners inasmuch as 
they had not appealed the earlier decision of the district court.18 No evidence was 
submitted at the hearing on the Owners' nonconforming use as "ski" rentals, e.g., credit 
card or other receipts, correspondence with renters, purchase price of the properties, 
improvements made in preparation of their new use, advertizing, income or motel taxes 
paid. 
10. The Owners petitioned the district court for a review of the decision of the 
Board of Adjustment. On August 16,1999, the court held a hearing on the parties' cross 
motions for summary judgment, and on November 18,1999, Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
granted summary judgment for the City on both the nonconforming use and the collateral 
estoppel issues.19 
17
 No evidence was submitted by the Owners to show that they were using the properties 
for short-term rentals when the new ordinance went into effect in 1998. Para. 11, Sandy 
Bd. of Adj. Findings of Fact and Conclusions, R. at 240. 
18
 R. at 240. 
19
 R. at 446 
6 
11. On appeal from the district court, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the 
district court decision on the nonconforming use and collateral estoppel issues,20 from 
which this court has granted certiorari. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Collinses improperly raise a new issue for the first time before this court. 
The Collinses improperly raise an argument for the first time on certiorari to this court,21 
the argument that the issue preclusion applies against the City in this case because the 
City lost the case of Brown et al. v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, in what is called 
nonmutual collateral estoppel. They cite no valid authority for their argument, nor has 
the applicability of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel been decided in Utah, nor has 
the use of nonmutual collateral estoppel against a City been decided. 
II. Collinses' Arguments Attacking Moitie Are Unsound. The Court of 
Appeals in its decision below, relied in part upon Federated Dept. Stores v. Moitie , 452 
U.S. 394,101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981). The efforts of the Property Owners 
attempting to differentiate Moitie from this case on factual grounds do not hold up. 
III. Issue preclusion should apply here under the Rest. 2d Judgments §28(2) 
balancing test. Courts have stated strong interests in precluding relitigation of cases 
20
 Collins v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, 2000 UT 371, 16 P.3d 1251 
21
 See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995) ("Issues not raised in the court of 
appeals may not be raised on certiorari unless the issue arose for the first time out 
of the court of appeals1 decision."); see also Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service 
Commission, 917 P.2d 1082 (1996). 
7 
which have once been decided on the merits. Even if the Court of Appeals erred in 
relying on Moitie and other claims preclusion cases for its decision, issue preclusion is 
still appropriate to apply in this case. The Property Owners argue that where there is an 
intervening appellate decision between the first and second cases which changes the law, 
issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, should not preclude relitigation of the issue, 
citing Cassidy v. Board of Education22 and Restatement (Second) Judgments §28(2). 
In collateral estoppel cases where there has been a substantial change of law 
between the first and second cases, the Restatement and other authorities call for a 
balancing of the interests in repose against the interest in continuing the second lawsuit. 
The property interests in reliance and repose of the City's citizens, and particularly the 
homeowners in the neighborhoods where these three ski rental homes were used, who 
might now be affected by the rental of these homes from week to week by reopening the 
issue, outweighs the any interest of the Owners in being treated like other ski owners 
who won the Brown case. The interests of the neighbors are all the more compelling 
here because the Owners made a deliberate choice not to appeal the first Board of 
Adjustment decision and district court judgment in this case. The balancing of interests 
therefore favors the City in this case, and issue preclusion should be applied. 
In any event, the Collinses failed to submit any evidence of their nonconforming 
use to the Sandy City Board of Adjustment when they came before it the second time. 
22
 316 Md. 50, 557 A.2d 227 (Md. App. 1989). 
8 
Their appeal would therefore fail even if this court corrects the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COLLINSES MAY NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF NONMUTUAL 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE CITY AT THIS STAGE 
Besides to its being outside the scope of the issue before the court, the Collinses 
improperly raise the argument that collateral estoppel prevents the City from its position 
in this action for the first time in their brief to this court.23 Offensive use of collateral 
estoppel is generally inappropriate where a party could easily have joined in the litigation 
it seeks to benefit from by use of the case.24 The Collinses could have appealed the 
district court judgment in the first case in this matter, and then have moved for 
consolidation with Brown, et al. in the appeal on the ski rental issue to the Court of 
Appeals, thereby avoiding the waste of resources involved in this litigation. Instead, they 
chose to sit back and wait to see what happened in the Brown case, and now seek to use 
it to their advantage. Such nonmutual offensive use of collateral estoppel tends to 
23
 See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995) ("Issues not raised in the court of 
appeals may not be raised on certiorari unless the issue arose for the first time out of the 
court of appeals' decision."). 
24
 see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 
(1979) 
9 
increase litigation, unlike defensive use of collateral estoppel, which tends to reduce 
litigation, one of the reasons it is disfavored.25 
The Property Owners rely on Hill v. Seattle First Nat Bank,26 but that case does 
not support their assertion of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel against the City, a 
doctrine without precedent in Utah.27 
II. THE ARGUMENTS ATTACKING MOITIE ARE UNSOUND. 
The Collinses argue that the Court of Appeals erred in relying upon Moitie for its 
decision applying issue preclusion to their second case. They attempt to distinguish 
Moitie from the present case on several grounds. First, these Property Owners argue that 
in Moitie, the precluded parties in that federal antitrust case (plaintiffs Moitie and 
Brown) were original parties to the decision that resulted in the reversal of the law, 
whereas in this case, the Collinses were not parties to the suit which changed the law in 
Brown.28 In fact, Moitie, Brown, and the other original plaintiffs against Federated 
Department Stores, the defendant, each brought separate suits which were all assigned to 
the same federal judge and dismissed at the same time, but were never, apparently, 
25
 See id. 
26
 827P.2d241 (Utah 1992) 
27
 See Utah v. Clinton Perank, 858 P.2d 927 (Utah 1992), footnote 3, J. Zimmerman 
dissenting. Hill v. Seattle First Nat Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 1992), an opinion by J. 
Zimmerman, was a defensive use of collateral estoppel. 
28
 Collinses'Brief at 8. 
10 
consolidated into a single case. This factual distinction is thus without foundation. 
The Collinses also argue that the cases are different because in Moitie, the original 
plaintiffs were "forum shopping."29 Why this should be significant is not explained, if it 
was the case,30 nor is it discernable. 
The Collinses also distinguish Moitie from the present case on the ground that the 
change in law in Moitie was entirely unanticipated, whereas in the first Collins v. Sandy 
City case, the appeal by Brown was a fully prepared appeal pending before the Utah 
Court of Appeals when the Collinses elected not to appeal the adverse district court 
judgment. Collinses' Brief at 7. This distinction is of little consequence since any 
appeal to an appellate court has the potential of creating a change in law. Surely the 
parties bringing the appeal in the Moitie case anticipated a change in law; otherwise, they 
would not likely have gone to the trouble of appealing. To distinguish appellate cases on 
the basis of which would result in a change in the law can only be practiced in hindsight. 
Snyder v. Newcomb Oil Co, Inc.,31 relied on by the Collinses, is not on point since 
that case involved claim preclusion and an intervening legislative change, rather than a 
29
 Collinses'Brief at 8. 
30
 Moitie, one of the two plaintiffs in the original action in the Supreme Court case, did 
file its original action against Federated in state court; Brown, the other, filed in federal 
district court. After removal of Moitie's case to the federal district court, and dismissal, 
both parties filed in a single suit in state court which Federated again removed to federal 
district court, where it was dismissed. 
31
 603 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (App. Div. 1993) 
11 
change in court precedent, as here. Likewise, Foley v. Roche,32 also cited in the brief of 
the Collinses, was a case involving overruling the law of the case rather than issue 
preclusion. 
Moitie, cited as support by the Court of Appeals in its decision, while a claims 
preclusion, and not an issue preclusion case, is nonetheless important for the general rule 
that courts are unwilling to allow a party to relitigate a case after foregoing an 
opportunity to appeal in the first instance. Although the context is somewhat different 
here, the need for finality in judgements is nonetheless an important consideration in this 
matter. 
III. EVEN IF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS IN ERROR IN 
RELYING ONMOITIE, ISSUE PRECLUSION SHOULD STILL 
APPLY HERE. 
A. Courts favor repose and finality of judgments in reducing 
redundant litigation 
Justice Harlan of the U.S. Supreme Court said that the object for which 
civil courts have been established in our society is to secure the peace and repose of the 
community by the settlement of matters which can be determined by judicial 
administration, and that the enforcement of judgments is essential to the maintenance of 
social order.33 But for such enforcement, the assistance of the courts would not be 
2
 447 N.Y.S.2d 528 (App. Div. 1982) 
33
 Southern Pacific R.R. v. U.S., 168 U.S. 1,48,18 S.Ct. 18, 27,42 L.Ed. 355 (1897) 
12 
sought in resolving disputes.34 One of the central objectives of our modern system of 
civil procedure is putting an end to litigation by according finality to judgments.35 The 
established rule is that preclusion cannot be defeated by electing to forgo an available 
opportunity to appeal.36 Once the time for appeal has run, a judgment is res judicata 
without regard to the fact that an appeal might have been taken to a higher court.37 
Both branches of res judicata, claims preclusion, and issue preclusion, serve the 
important judicial purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating the same 
issue with the same party or his privy.38 They serve the additional benefit of promoting 
judicial economy by preventing needless litigation/9 
The Owners argue that application of issue preclusion is unfair inasmuch as they 
are "being penalized for pursuing their legal remedy."40 But it is their decision not to 
pursue their legal remedy when they could have which created this second unnecessary 
34 Id. 
35
 Marcus, Redish, Sherman, Civil Procedure: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.) at 1091 Each 
branch promotes the important judicial policy of preventing parties from relitigating a 
claim or issue. 
36
 Wright, Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Appeals Foregone, 
Pending or Unavailable §4433 at 305. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Penrodv. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 1983) 
39
 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 
328-329 (1971) 
40
 Collinses'brief at 9. 
13 
suit. Their failure to appeal the earlier decision of the Board of Adjustment41 and the 
district court judgment was unjustified where there was no decision in Utah on the issue 
being tried, notwithstanding that other property owners had appealed in the Brown, et al. 
v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment case.42 The Owners argue that their failure to appeal 
was in the interest of judicial economy. An appeal to the Court of Appeals and a motion 
to consolidate their case with the appellants in Brown, however, would have served that 
interest, and these Owners would have also preserved their legal position, thereby 
avoiding the wastefulness and redundancy of this second lawsuit. 
The Owners' position also overlooks the effect that such a change would have on 
those who have relied upon the Board of Adjustment and district court decisions at 
earlier stages on these properties: the many homeowners who expressed such opposition 
and concern about these motel-like commercial uses in their neighborhoods, with 
different renters coming and going from week to week. Those neighborhood owners 
41
 The Maison Drive property was not listed in the appeal to the district court in the 
Amended Complaint, R. at 174. The Board of Adjustment decision therefore became 
final when the Owners did not appeal to the decision on the legality of the short-term 
rentals as to that property to the Third District Court. §10-9-708(3), Utah Code Ann. 
(1999) (petition for district court review is barred unless filed within 30 days after the 
Board of Adjustment decision.) 
42
 This case differs from most change of law by court decision cases in this respect. 
There was no settled rule in Utah before the Brown decision on whether a city's 
ordinances could prohibit a zoning use by exception. The decision of these Property 
Owners not to appeal was therefore not done in reliance upon anything other than the 
district court determination. If they felt that this ruling was wrong, they should have 
sought to correct it appeal. 
14 
may have relied upon the decision of the Board and the judgment of the district court, but 
for which they might have sold their homes and moved away to other neighborhoods. 
After the passage of time, the market conditions for such a sale may be less favorable. In 
a similar position are those families which may have purchased homes near one of these 
ski houses based on the earlier unappealed judgments. As Wright, Miller and Cooper say 
on the problems of expanding the exceptions to res judicata based on intervening 
changes of law or fact, "If issue preclusion is to mean anything, such reliance should be 
protected."43 
Property rights are one of the areas where the interests in reliance and repose are 
particularly compelling, and where the protections of issue preclusion should be 
maintained. When . . . title to real property is at issue, the need for finality is at its 
apex."44 "Just as broad public interests may ease the way to reconsideration, so 
important private interests of repose or reliance may require that preclusion apply despite 
the clearest changes of the legal climate," citing, as examples, pension benefits won, and 
title to property as deserving the same protection, id. at 263.45 Wright, et al., conclude 
43
 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Issue Preclusion -
Questions of Law and Law Application §4425, at 252. This treatise may hereinafter be 
referred to as 18 Wright § . 
44
 American Estate Management Corp. v. International Investment and Development 
Corp., 986 P.2d 765 (Ut. App. 1999); See Farrell v. Brown, 729 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1986); 18 Wright, §4408, at 65 (1981). 
45
 18 Wright §4425 at 252. 
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by arguing for a balancing test where there has been a change of law, and where there are 
offsetting interests in reliance and repose. "A balance must be struck between the clarity 
of the change, special needs presented by specific areas of the law, and particularly 
strong needs to preserve the values of preclusion."46 
The Restatement (Second) Judgments also acknowledges the need for a balancing 
between the importance of stability in the legal relationship between the immediate 
parties and problems of disparate legal treatment.47 
B. The balancing of interests here favors applying issue preclusion. 
The balancing of interests for and against preclusion in this case must weigh on 
one side of the scale the Owners'need for equal treatment with other similarly 
situated owners, and on the other side, their calculated determination to forego an 
available appeal on a point of law which had not been decided by any appellate court in 
Utah, and the interests of families living in the neighborhoods affected by the Owners' 
short-term rentals. These neighbors may have relied upon the unappealed judgment in 
the earlier case. While the Owners declined to submit evidence on such issues as the 
46
 Ma t264 . 
47
 Rest. 2d Judgments §28 Comment c at 278. The reference therein to the legal 
relationships between the "immediate parties" should apply to the City in this case, where 
the City's enforcement of its ordinances is on behalf of the residents of the neighborhoods 
where these short-term rentals occurred. See State v. Bishop, 111 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986) 
(Individuals have an interest in being free from harm, and government has an obligation 
to protect individuals who are otherwise defenseless.) 
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purchase price they paid for the homes which they turned into rental units or any 
improvements they may have made to them, one can suppose that they paid a fair 
residential market value for the properties and their subsequent sale or use as long-term 
rentals, allowed by City ordinances, is a reasonable rate of return on those properties. A 
balancing of these interests in this instance clearly favors the application of preclusion in 
this case.48 
The case ofMars land v. International Society of Krishna Consciousness ,49 cited 
in Cassidy v. Board of Education,50 relied on by the Collinses, is instructive in this 
regard. The International Society of Krishna Consciousness (Society) leased a large 
home in a residential zone in the city of Honolulu where it held religious services and 
gatherings, and also had more than 30 people live, more than five of whom were 
unrelated. The city brought a criminal case against the Society for violating its 
ordinances prohibiting more than five unrelated individuals from living in a residence. 
The Society defended in district court claiming they were a church, which is an allowed 
use in a residential zone. Honolulu then brought an action for injunctive and declaratory 
relief against the Society to prohibit it from continuing to use the home as a residence for 
48
 Although exceptions to collateral estoppel present less danger to interests of repose 
and reliance than do exceptions to claims preclusion, see 18 Wright §4415, Esslinger v. 
Baltimore City, 95 Md. App. 607, 622 A.2d 774 (Md.Sp.App. 1993), footnote 5, the 
balancing is still required in issue preclusion cases as provided in the Rest. 2d and Wright. 
49
 66 Haw. 119, 657 P.2d 1035 (1983) 
50
 316Md.50,557A.2d227(1989) 
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more than five unrelated persons. The Society raised collateral estoppel. The court, 
applying Rest. 2d §28(2), determined that fairness to all others in the city required it to 
refuse preclusion in this case. "In applying the doctrine of res judicata as [the Society] 
would have us do, we wold be permitting it to continue to violate the ordinance without 
fear of governmental sanctions while at the same time warning other parties that the same 
ordinance would be enforced against them. This would be an absurd and unreasonable 
application of the doctrine."51 
In support of its decision, the Hawaii Supreme Court quoted the following 
passage on the issue of whether a city can apply for an injunction even after an acquittal 
of a criminal charge, " . . . [T]he rights of other property owners in the zoning district 
where the violations occurred must necessarily be considered. Only by injunction could 
these property rights be protected and the objectives of the ordinance promoted." 52 The 
rights of the property owners in the affected neighborhoods in Sandy need this Court's 
protection of their rights against similar intrusive property uses. 
Of course, the Collinses may claim that Marsland only supports their argument 
that even in a zoning case, collateral estoppel will be overridden. But the language of the 
opinion suggests that the property interest of the larger community is preeminent.53 The 
51
 66 Haw. at 125 
52
 66 Haw. at 126, quoting City of New Orleans v. Lafon, 61 So.2d 270 (La. App. 1952) 
53
 The opinion cites other jurisdictions where similar decisions were reached in favor of 
zoning ordinances when balanced against the interest of the private property owner in a 
18 
Collinses argue that they are unfairly treated because other property owners are allowed 
to rent their homes as short-term rentals pursuant to the Brown decision, but they alone 
are not. Marsland makes clear that it is not just the interest of the individual property 
owner which is weighed in these equities. The entire community must follow the zoning 
ordinances to make a city liveable.54 
C. Cassidy is distinguishable from this case 
The Property Owners cite Cassidy v. Board of Education55 in support of their 
position. In that case the plaintiffs' complaint for an assault and rape suffered on the 
grounds of the public school was dismissed for a failure of proper notice to the school 
board. The plaintiffs did not have an opportunity to litigate the case fully on its merits in 
criminal issue preclusion context. 
54
 Where a party claims that the strict application of the zoning ordinances is 
unreasonable, or unfair, such as in cases involving prior nonconforming uses, variances, 
and special exceptions, zoning codes, including Sandy City's normally provide for a relief 
valve through the board of adjustment. The purpose of the board of adjustment, 
composed of members of the community familiar with its values, needs, and the zoning 
ordinances, is to make these fact-intensive determinations in applying the zoning 
ordinances. The Collinses, like others, had an opportunity to come before the Board and 
present evidence showing that their properties qualified as nonconforming, but put on no 
evidence in their support, and so the short-term rental use was not allowed. Of course, 
they are still allowed to do long-term rentals. 
55 316 Md. 50, 557 A.2d 227 (1989) 
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the first instance because the case was dismissed before an answer was even filed;56 
whereas the Collinses had a full opportunity to litigate. 
Collateral estoppel applies when a case is actually litigated and determined by a 
valid and final judgment.57 The reliance on an equitable remedy called for in 
Restatement (Second) Judgments §28(2)(b)58 is appropriate in Cassidy, but here the 
counterbalancing interests in repose are much stronger. The availability of appellate 
review as a reassurance of the correctness of a lower court decision is a critical factor in 
applying the preclusion doctrine59 and in the specific application of Rest. 2d Judgments 
§28(2)(b).60 Where that appellate review was readily available and foregone, the need to 
"As a general rule, dismissal for failure to satisfy a precondition is 'not an 
adjudication on the merits that would bar assertion of the same claim after satisfying the 
precondition..., but it should preclude relitigation of the same precondition issue.'" 
Cassidy at 233. 
57
 Restatement (Second) Judgments §27 
58
 §28(2)(b) provides "Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid 
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the 
issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following 
circumstances: 
"(2) The issue is one of law and . . . (b) a new determination is warranted in order to 
take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to 
avoid inequitable administration of the laws. . . " 
59
 See 18 Wright §4433at 315, Rest. Second of Judgments §28, comment a. See also 18 
Wright §4434 at320, 321 (Application of issue preclusion does not depend on absence of 
appeal alone, but on quality of the first tribunal, and special factors which explain the lack 
of appellate review.) 
60
 Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F.Supp. 725, 741-742 (D.C.Md. 1977), remanded and 
modified on other grounds 604 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1979) 
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review the decision again is greatly reduced, and weighs against the Owners in the 
balancing of their interests. The property owners here have demonstrated no adverse 
impact to the public generally of applying issue preclusion in this case, a significant 
concern to courts in applying Rest. 2d §28(2)(b).61 On the contrary, as discussed above, 
applying preclusion in this case is in the public interest inasmuch as it preserves the 
health, safety and welfare of the neighborhood by supporting the zoning plan enacted by 
the City. 
CONCLUSION 
The important role of preclusion in preventing the burden of relitigation of issues 
already decided after a full and fair hearing on the merits, should not be set aside in this 
case where the petitioners, the Collinses, elected to forego an available appeal. This, in 
addition to the strong need for repose given the interests of property owners who may 
have relied on the first judgment between these parties, and the public generally, favor 
the application of issue preclusion here. If, in correcting the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, the court determines that collateral estoppel should not apply in this situation, 
the refusal of the Property Owners to present evidence supporting their application of 
nonconforming use would in any event obviate the need for the expenditure of further 
judicial resources on this case. 
See Rutherfordv. California, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1267, 1284, 233 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1987) 
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